Unitization of Oil and Gas Reservoirs: A Reply to Professor Merrill by Hazlett, George W.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 63 Issue 3 
1965 
Unitization of Oil and Gas Reservoirs: A Reply to Professor Merrill 
George W. Hazlett 
Member of the Ohio Bar 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law and Economics Commons, and the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
George W. Hazlett, Unitization of Oil and Gas Reservoirs: A Reply to Professor Merrill, 63 MICH. L. REV. 519 
(1965). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/5 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS RESERVOffiS: 
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR MERRILL 
George W. Hazlett• 
IN "Compulsory Oil and Gas Unitization,"1 Professor Maurice H. Merrill launched an attack on unitization of oil and gas reservoirs 
in the form of a sharply critical review of the decision by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in favor of 
the defendant in Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co.2 
Terming his review the "hypothetical judgment" of a mythical 
court of justice, Professor Merrill stated that, if the questions in-
volved were determined improperly, "the effect of the precedent, 
if we allow it to go unexamined, may be most unfortunate."3 On 
the other hand, if Professor Merrill's disagreement with the decision 
was based upon an erroneous concept of the facts of the case, it 
would be even more unfortunate if his review were permitted to 
stand unchallenged.4' 
The case involved an "overriding royalty" that had been re-
served in an assignment to the defendant of oil and gas leases cover• 
ing approximately one thousand acres of then undrilled lands in 
the West Edmond Field of Oklahoma. Each of the leases reserved 
to the lessor, as royalty, one-eighth of the oil and gas that might be 
produced. The overriding royalty reserved in the assignment con-
sisted of one-half of the remaining seven-eighths of the production 
from the leases, less a deduction for each month of production equal 
in value to two hundred dollars for each producing well drilled 
under the leases; the overriding royalty, like the landowner's royalty, 
was not chargeable with any part of the development and operating 
expenses. During 1943 and 1944, defendant drilled and completed 
for production under the assigned leases a total of twenty-three wells 
which were completed for production from the Hunton Lime forma-
tion. Prior to the 1943 assignment, well-spacing orders that had been 
issued by the Corporation Commission of Oklahoma-the state's 
regulatory agency for oil and gas production-had prohibited the 
• Member of the Ohio Bar.-Ed. 
1. Merrill, Compulsory Oil and Gas Unitization: Effect on Overriding Royalty 
Obligations, 62 MICH. L. R.Ev. 381 (1964). 
2. 296 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1961). 
3. Merrill, supra note I, at 381. 
4. The writer of this reply participated in the trial and argument of the cited case 
on behalf of the defendant. He, therefore, does not claim the same degree of impar• 
tiality attributed by Professor Merrill to his court of judicial review. 
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drilling of more than one well on any quarter-quarter section. In 
compliance with these orders, no more than one well was drilled 
by the defendant on any forty-acre tract. 
In 1945, the Oklahoma Legislature adopted a unitization statute, 
which authorized the Corporation Commission to order the unitized 
operation of an entire reservoir of oil and gas.I' Pursuant to this 
statute, the entire Hunton Lime formation, underlying nearly thirty 
thousand acres of land in the West Edmond Field, was unitized by 
an order of the Commission which became effective October 1, 
1947.6 In that order, the Commission prescribed a "plan of unitiza-
tion" that treated each quarter-quarter section within the unitized 
area as a separately owned tract, assigned to each such tract a per-
centage interest that was found by the Commission to represent the 
tract's fair and equitable share of the quantity of oil and gas re-
coverable from the reservoir, and required the allocation to each 
tract of that portion of all unit production that was equal to its per-
centage interest. The plan also provided for allocation of all ex-
penses among the tracts in proportion to their respective percentage 
interests and imposed upon the lessee of a tract the obligation to 
pay the amount of expense allocated to the tract. Both the statute 
and the plan required that the quantity of oil and gas so allo-
cated to a tract be considered as production therefrom "for all 
intents, uses and purposes" and that the allocated quantity be dis-
tributed among, or the proceeds thereof paid to, those entitled to 
share in production from the tract "in the same manner, in the 
same proportions, and upon the same conditions" that they would 
have shared in the production from the tract, or the proceeds there-
of, "had not the unit been organized." 
Prior to this unitization, the computation of plaintiffs' over-
riding royalty had been based upon actual production from the 
twenty-three wells drilled by defendant, but, thereafter, the compu-
tation was based upon the production allocated, in accordance with 
the plan of unitization, to the tracts on which the wells were located. 
From time to time, beginning in 1951, some of the wells on these 
tracts were abandoned as no longer needed under unitized opera-
tion. However, the monthly per well deduction was continued in 
respect of each of the twenty-three tracts, whether or not a pro-
ducing well was actually located thereon. 
In 1954, after nearly seven years of unitized operation, plaintiffs' 
5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.1 (1961). The statute was held valid in Palmer Oil 
Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 204 Okla. 543, 231 P.2d 997 (1951). 
6. Order No. 20212, Corp. Comm'n No. 1355. 
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suit was commenced. Their complaint demanded a judicial decree 
revising the terms of their overriding royalty agreement by elimi-
nating the monthly per well deduction, alleging at length that the 
1943 assignment had contemplated development and operation of 
the assigned leases by "competitive" methods in reliance on the skill 
and initiative of defendant, that unitization had substituted for the 
judgment of the defendant the judgment of the operating committee 
provided for in the plan of unitization, and that, under unitized 
operation, plaintiffs had received from the overriding royalty "less 
monthly revenue" than they would have received if competitive 
operations had been continued. The substance of these allegations 
was incorporated in Professor Merrill's statement of the facts of the 
case, it being stated in his review that "the allocable production 
under the unitized operation has resulted in less monthly revenue 
to the tracts under the Agreement than was realized under individ-
ual operation" and also that the effect of unitization had been "to 
alter to the detriment of F the obligations upon which he could 
rely to keep the production up to levels which would assure a 
return to him after the per-well deductions had been made."7 These 
statements are directly contrary to the evidence presented on trial 
of the case. 
There was, of course, no dispute about the actual income from 
the overriding royalty; it was stipulated that between October I, 
1947, when unitization became effective, and December 1958, plain-
tiffs had actually received 878,084 dollars. However, determination 
of the income that would have accrued to the overriding royalty 
had there been no unitization necessarily required an estimate of 
the quantities of oil and gas that would have been produced from 
the twenty-three tracts under "competitive" operations; this estimate 
could be made with accuracy because of the production data avail-
able by 1959, the time of trial. For the purposes of this estimate, 
plaintiffs engaged a qualified and experienced reservoir engineer 
whose testimony, supported by numerous exhibits, was presented 
at the trial. This expert witness estimated that, if competitive opera-
tions had been continued, the income accruing to the overriding 
royalty between October 1, 1947, and December 31, 1958, would 
have amounted to only 390,336 dollars.8 Thus, plaintiffs' own evi-
dence showed that unitized operation had produced two and one-
fourth times as much income to the credit of the overriding royalty 
as would have accrued thereto had there been no unitization. 
7. Merrill, supra note 1, at 385, 397. 
8. Record, app. p. 162. 
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Forced to concede that, instead of being injured, they had been 
substantially benefited by unitization, plaintiffs still demanded 
relief on the ground that defendant had profited even more, con-
tending that the overriding royalty should be adjusted so that the 
percentage of increase in income to the plaintiffs should be equal 
to that of the increase to defendant. In asserting this as a ground 
for relief, plaintiffs ignored the stipulated fact9 that, after deducting 
the cost of drilling, equipping, and operating the twenty-three wells, 
defendant's net income for the period before unitization was only 
1,095 dollars, while the income accruing to the overriding royalty 
during the same period amounted to 1,444,759 dollars. The court 
of appeals quite properly disposed of plaintiffs' contention by the 
following statement, which was severely criticized in the "concurring 
opinion" included in Professor Merrill's article:10 
"We do not deem relevant the argument advanced concerning 
the relative profits of the parties. The rights of parties fixed by 
contract are not governed by comparing their subsequent rela-
tive gains or losses."11 
Plaintiffs also argued that, in any event, the monthly per well 
deduction should not have been made in respect of tracts having 
wells that had been abandoned, although they readily agreed that the 
portion of unit production allocated to such tracts was properly 
considered as "produced from" such tracts within the meaning of 
the assignment reserving the overriding royalty. Rejecting this argu-
ment also, the court of appeals found that the statute and the plan 
of unitization "require the assumption that the amount of unit 
production allocated to a tract be considered as 'production from' 
such tract, even though there is no well actually located on the 
tract, and the further assumption that a producing well is located 
on every tract."12 
It should be noted that the court's opinion did not mention 
the benefit derived by the plaintiffs from unitized operation. The 
decision was based solely on the ground that self-executing pro-
visions of the statute and the plan of unitization had modified the 
agreement between plaintiffs and defendant by substituting allo-
cated production for actual production and precluded further modi-
fication by judicial decree. Whether unitized operation had benefited 
9. Record, supplemental app. p. 17. 
10. Merrill, supra note 1, at 416-18. 
11. Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 296 F.2d 274, 281 (7th Cir. 
1961). 
12. Ibid. 
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or harmed the plaintiffs was not material, in view of the basis for 
the decision. The fact that plaintiffs had profited greatly from uniti-
zation is emphasized here only because Professor Merrill's argument 
is based upon the assumption that the case demonstrated the harm-
ful effect of unitized operation on an overriding royalty interest 
and similar interests. 
COMPETITIVE VERSUS UNITIZED OPERATION 
Professor Merrill argues that only the "competitive race to 
produce" adequately protects the royalty owner, whose income (like 
that of the overriding royalty owner) depends solely upon the 
quantities of oil and gas accruing to his interest, both interests being 
free of expenses. Actually, the kind of competition advocated by 
Professor Merrill has been outlawed for many years in Oklahoma 
and most of the other producing states. Since 1915, Oklahoma has 
had proration statutes under which the Corporation Commission 
issues orders fixing the "allowable" production from each field or 
reservoir and "prorating" the allowable production among the wells 
in the field; the allowable production may be based either upon 
market demand or upon the quantity of oil or gas that can be pro-
duced from the reservoir without unnecessary dissipation of the 
reservoir energy.13 Since 1935, it has also had a "well spacing" 
statute under which the Corporation Commission is authorized to 
issue orders prescribing the spacing of wells by establishing "drill-
ing" units of uniform size for each reservoir and prohibiting the 
drilling of more than one well on any drilling unit; when the drill-
ing unit is composed of two or more separately owned tracts of 
land, a "pooling" of tracts may be ordered by the Commission in a 
manner that permits the owner of each interest to share in the 
production from the one permitted well.14 
The effect of these well-spacing and proration orders is to elimi-
nate the "competitive race to produce." In the West Edmond Field, 
for example, the Commission prescribed forty-acre spacing and, at 
various times prior to unitization, fixed a uniform rate of allow-
able production for all wells in the field. Under these circumstances, 
the most diligent and efficient operator could not legally produce 
I!!. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 231-52, 271-79 (1961). The statute enacted in Oklahoma 
on Feb. 13, 1915, was the first proration statute. It was upheld in Julian Oil 
& Royalty Co. v. Capshaw, 145 Okla. 237, 292 Pac. 841 (1930), and in Champlin Re-
fining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932). 
14. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1 (1961). The state's first well-spacing statute was 
enacted in 1935. It was upheld in Patterson v. Stanolind Oil &: Gas Co., 182 
Okla. 155, 77 P.2d 83 (1938). 
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from any forty-acre tract a single barrel of oil in excess of the 
quantity his neighbors were permitted to produce. 
The conditions that occasioned the enactment of state conserva-
tion laws are vividly portrayed in Legal History of Conservation of 
Oil and Gas, published in 1938 by the Section of Mineral Law of 
the American Bar Association.15 In the days of unregulated compe-
tition, each operator drilled wells as fast as he could and produced 
oil therefrom at the highest possible rate in order to capture for 
himself as much oil as possible. Even when the production exceeded 
the capacity of transportation facilities or the market demand, the 
operator continued to produce at maximum rates, sometimes 
building metal or wooden storage tanks, but more often running 
the oil into pits dug out of the ground or into ponds enclosed by 
earthen dikes. The inevitable consequence was the waste of vast 
quantities of oil through evaporation, leakage, and destruction by 
fire-an ever present hazard of open storage. Even greater quantities 
were lost in the reservoir, because too many wells and production 
at excessive rates dissipated the reservoir energy or caused water 
encroachment or other conditions that made continued production 
unprofitable. Many an oil reservoir was abandoned after recovery 
of no more than fifteen per cent of the oil in place.16 
This waste was largely due to ignorance concerning the nature 
and mechanics of the petroleum reservoir, which is still referred 
to as a "pool" for the reason that, in the early days, oil was thought 
to exist in underground lakes or pools. Eventually, it was learned 
that oil existed in the intergranular or pore space of a stratum of 
othenvise solid rock. It was also learned that the primary requisite 
to the accumulation of oil in commercial quantities is the existence 
of a barrier that prevents further movement of oil that has migrated 
through the stratum. Once the oil is thus trapped, it is securely 
locked in a reservoir from which it cannot escape otherwise than 
through openings provided by wells drilled into the reservoir.17 
The energy required to force the oil through the rock stratum into 
a well is provided by forces such as gas compressed in the reservoir, 
or "water drive"; because of these forces, oil may exist in the reser-
voir under pressures of hundreds of pounds per square inch. When 
this natural energy is gone, the oil remaining in the reservoir is 
forever lost, except to the extent that it may be produced by means 
of water flooding or repressuring through injection of gas or like 
15. LEGAL HlsroRY OF CONSERVATION OF On. AND GAS (ABA ed. 19!18). 
16. PETROLEUM CONSERVATION (Buckley ed. 1951). 
17. Id. at 48. 
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operations, which frequently are not feasible and necessarily involve 
great expense. 
Although conservation through proration and well spacing has 
greatly increased the percentage of recovery from oil reservoirs, it 
was gradually recognized that, in the case of many, and perhaps 
most, reservoirs, only unitized operation of the entire reservoir 
would permit maximum recovery. As stated in Petroleum Conserva-
tion: 
"Unit operation frees the operation of a pool of those restric-
tions that might otherwise be imposed by the conflicting inter-
ests of the individual owners. Under unit operation there is 
no conflict of interests, but, instead, a joint and common inter-
est in carrying out the operation as efficiently and economically 
as possible for the maximum recovery."18 
Under unitization, the owners of interests in a particular tract 
of land exchange their right to the oil and gas produced from that 
tract for the right to a portion of the total production from the 
reservoir. This exchange makes it possible to ignore surface bound-
ary lines of the lands underlaid by the reservoir; well locations 
are determined solely by reservoir characteristics, instead of being 
dictated by requirements imposed by separate ownership of lands; 
and each well may be produced at the rate calculated to utilize the 
energy of the reservoir to maximum advantage. Unitization also 
makes possible a greatly increased recovery through injection of 
water, gas, or other fluids to maintain or augment reservoir pressure. 
Application of these "secondary" recovery methods ordinarily re-
quire unitization because they cause movement of oil and gas 
within the reservoir in a manner that would be detrimental to 
certain tracts and beneficial to others under individual operations. 
The benefits to be derived from unitization had been demon-
strated by units formed by voluntary agreement before enactment 
of the Oklahoma unitization statute of 1945. Even today, unitiza-
tion requires voluntary agreement in most states, as only a few have 
enacted statutes authorizing a state regulatory agency to order 
unitized operation. Too frequently, unitization by voluntary agree-
ment is unattainable; because virtual unanimity on the part of 
both royalty owners and lessees is necessary for adequate control of 
the reservoir, a small minority of interest owners may be in a posi-
tion to block unitization by purely voluntary agreement. 
This difficulty is eliminated by statutes that provide for unitiza-
18. Id. at 281. 
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tion that is sometimes referred to as "compulsory" because it does 
not require unanimous agreement. However, the Oklahoma statute 
requires the written consent of at least sixty-three per cent in in-
terest of both royalty owners and lessees to give effect to an order 
of the Commission; the comparable statutes of Arkansas19 and 
Louisiana20 require the concurrence of seventy-five per cent in 
interest of both royalty owners and lessees. Actually, unitization 
under these statutes is compulsory only in the same sense that forma-
tion of a drainage district, a sanitary district, or the like is compul-
sory when put into effect by the vote of a majority of the affected 
lando,;vners. Moreover, the statutes require findings to the effect that 
unitization is necessary in order to conduct a method of operation 
that is not possible under individual operations, that the proposed 
unit operation is feasible, and that it will prevent waste and may be 
expected to produce oil and gas not otherwise recoverable. These 
requirements, together with the opportunity afforded to all inter-
ested parties to be heard, provide adequate safeguards against abuse 
of the statutory authority to order unitized operation. 
The successful result achieved by the West Edmond Unit is 
typical of the experiences of virtually all unitized operations and 
demonstrates that the royalty owner no longer has any reason to 
fear unitization. As stated in Petroleum Conservation: 
"As far as the royalty owner is concerned, the effect is not only 
to maintain his income at a higher level for a longer period 
than he could expect without unit operation, but also to pro-
tect his income from the risks associated with individual opera-
tion."21 
Twenty years ago, many royalty owners viewed unitization with the 
same suspicion as does Professor Merrill. Since then, unitized oper-
ation of an entire reservoir has proved its merits so conclusively that 
today the knowledgeable royalty owner welcomes it for the very 
good reason that he knows it will put more money in his pocket 
through an increased recovery. 
19. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-115 (1947). 
20. LA. REv. STAT. § 30-5 (1950). 
21. BUCKLEY, op. cit. supra note 16, at 294. 
